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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16132 
JOHNNIE MICHAEL CHAVEZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEJlll..ENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by information with the crimes 
of manslaughter in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-205(1) 
(a) , ( 19 7 3, as amended) , and Auto.mobile Homicide in violation 
of§ 76-5-207 Utah Code Ann., (1973, as amended). Both 
charges were filed as a result of an automobile accident 
in which appellant was involved on July 21, 1977. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried before the Honorable Ernest 
F. Baldwin, Jr., sitting with a jury, on March 27, 28, and 
29, 1978. The case was sent to the jury on the charge of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Au:tomobile Homicide and appellant was found guilty of that 
offense. Thereafter, appellant was committed to the Utah 
State Prison for the term provided by law, zero to five 
years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment 
of the lower court as well as the sentence imposed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 21, 1977, at approximately 10:45 p.m. 
at 3900 South State Street in Salt Lake City, appellant was 
involved in an automobile accident with another automobile 
driven by Gennar Skollingsberg (T. 39, 42, 179, 180). In 
the Skollingsberg vehicle was 26-month old Eric who died 
as a result of head injuries sufferec. in the accident (T. 43). 
At trial, Mr. Skollingsberg testified that he 
was southbound on State Street, stopped for a red light in 
the left turn lane, then turned left, or east, onto 3900 
South when his car was hit by an automobile coming north 
on State Street (T. 38-42). The automobile that collided 
with Mr. Skollingsberg's was driven by the appellant, 
Johnnie Chavez (T. 179, 180). Mr. Skollingsberg also strt~ 
that he began to proceed turning left into the intersection 
once the green arrow in his lane of traffic came on (T. 4s- 4 ~I· 
He further testified that he noticed the through traffic 
-2-
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lights were red as the green arrow in his lane came on 
(T. 48-49) · Cars headed north on State Street in through 
traffic lanes were stopped at the intersection, with the 
exception of those cars turni.ng left into the intersection 
west on 3900 South (T. 53). 
Thelma Skollingsberg, Gennar's sister, was a 
passenger in the Skollingsberg car, and corroborated his 
testimony (T. 56-59; 60-63). In addition, she stated 
that as her brother began to turn into the intersection onto 
3900 South, she looked down State Street and saw a car 
(which turned out to be the one appellant was driving), 
"coming real quick" (T. 57). 
Richard Williams, a professional over-the-road 
truck driver, testified that he was stopped in the traffic 
lanes (through lanes), headed north on State Street at 3900 
South, waiting for the red light to change. He heard the 
sound of a car approaching from his right rear (the high 
revolutions of the motor turning (T. 67)), in a lane not 
used for through traffic (T. 66-67). This approaching 
car was driven by appellant and was estimated by Mr. 
Williams to be traveling at the rate of approximately 
65 miles per hour (T. 71). He also stated that he observed 
the car driven by appellant strike the Skollingsberg vehicle 
and bounce off (T. 67, 71). The light controlling the 
-3-
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traffic headed north on State Street, the direction in 
which appellant's car was heading, was red when the 
accident occurred (T 73) I d' t 1 f h 
. . mrne ia e y a ter t e collision, 
the light controlling :northbound through traffic on State 
Street turned green and traffic began to move (T. 76-79). 
Wayne Spens corroborated the testimony of Richard 
Williams, stating that as he sat stopped in his jeep at 
the intersection of State Street and 3900 South (he was 
headed iiiorth on State), his attention was drawn ito a high. 
loud. engine noise off to his right-hand side (T. 80-82). 
Spens was in the far right-hand lane (T. 81), and as he heard 
the noise of the engine from appellant's approaching car, 
he (Spens) turned his head just in time to see "a blur of 
a car" go by on his right (T. 821. He estimated the speed 
of appellant's car to be about 60 miles per hour as it 
entered the intersection and collided with the Skollingsberg 
vehicle (T. 83). Mr. Spens further stated that the color 
of the traffic light for through traffic heading '!no~th was 
red at the time appellant's vehicle entered the intersection 
(T. 83-84). 
Other passengers in Wayne Spen' s ieeP corroborated 
the fact that the liqht for :northbound traffic at 3900 south 
_:_and Stc.te Street was red (T. 91, 82, 89), that thev heard a 
-4-
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loud engine noise (T. 91), and that appellant was driving 
his car in a cement gutter portion of the road used only 
for right turns and as a bus stop (T. 66, 95), not for 
through traffic. Suzanna Pons also stated that she saw 
appellant exit the car from the driver's side following the 
crash, and noticed the appellant "wander around," acting 
like he was in a daze (T. 98,99). 
Two witnesses to the accident, John Oldroyd and Don 
Askee, testified that they were sittinq on a bench very close 
to the corner of 3900 South and State when appellant's 
vehicle ran the red light and hit the Skollingsberg vehicle 
(T. 109, 117). Both boys also stated that appellant's car 
went through the intersection in the far right-hand lane 
next to the gutter (T. 109, 116), before colliding with the 
other vehicle. They also stated that appellant's car was 
so close to the bench where they were sitting they had to 
pull their feet and legs up to keep from getting hit (T. 109, 
117) [the car was less than two feet from them (T. 109, 117) J • 
The arresting officers stated that the appellant 
was arrested as he was walking briskly and fast away from 
the scene of the accident (T. 122, 130). Appellant seemed 
to be uoset (T. 130), and both Officers Smith and Rigby 
detected the odor of alcoholic beveraqe about appellant's 
person (T. 123, 128). 
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Appellant was administered first aid for his 
iniuries at the scene of the accident, then taken to a 
hospital (T. 127, 133). Followinq his arrival at the 
hospital, samples of blood were taken from appellant at 
12:14 a.m. and 12:45 a.m. on July 22, 1977 (T. 190-191). 
While in the hospital, acpellant asked his friend Eppie 
Duran, a passenger in appellant's car, what color the 
(traffic) light was (T. 140). The nurse who drew the blood 
samples from appellant, Evelyn Mayberry. testified that she 
detected the odor of alcohol on appellant's breath and that 
his pupils were dilated (T. 191). 
Lynn Davis, a chemist with the City /County Health 
Department of Salt Lake County, testifed that he received 
the blood samples from Ms. Mayberry on July 22, 1977, and 
that on August 1, 1977, he analyzed them for the alcohol 
content level. usinq the "enzyme method" (T. 208, 212, 213). 
His results showed .19 percent ethyl alcohol by weight in 
both samples extracted from appellant (T. 214). 
Dr. Bryan Finkle, a pharmacologist, pathologist 
and toxicologisttestified that in general, an individual 
will reach their maximum blood alcohol concentration level 
about one hour after their last drink (T. 251}. He also 
stated that alcohol is cleared from the blood following 
. . . d. f h d . king occurs, maximum concentration, provi ing no urt er rin 
-6-
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at about 0.02% per hour (T. 252). Using two given situations, 
(absorption and alcohol clearance), Dr. Finkle testified 
that in one situation (alcohol elimination), if there was no 
drinking for a long period of time prior to the .19 alcohol 
level reading (at 12:15 a.m. on July 22, 1977), and using the 
fact that alcohol clears the blood at the rate of 0.02% 
per hour, then working back to a point in time of 10:15 p.m .. 
then an individual's <appellant's) blood alcohol would be 
about 0.23% at 10:15 p.m. IT. 263-264). In the· other 
situation (absorption), Dr. Finkle testified that again, 
assuming that all drinking by appellant ceased at 10:25 
p.m., the alcohol maximum concentration point would be 
reached at 11:15 p.m. (.21%), making the 12:15 a.m. alcohol 
level .19%. Then, at approximately 10:45 p.m., (the time 
of the accident), appellant's alcohol blood level would have 
been somewhere between .OS and .08 (T. 264-266). Dr. Finkle, 
however, further related that such a possibility of one's 
alcohol content going from zero (at 10:15 p.m.), to .21% in 
one hour is extremely unlikely (T. 266). He also testified 
that a person weighing the same as appellant (135 lb.), would 
have to have about 3.5 fluid ounces of pure alcohol (7 fluid 
ounces of 100 proof alcohol) circulatinq in their body to 
obtain a .19% alcohol blood readinq (T. 268). Furthermore, 
since most whiskey is SO-proof, appellant would have had 
-7-
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to consume about 9 fluid ounces of whiskey to have reached 
a .19% alcohol reading (T. 268) . Dr. Finkle said that even 
these figures constituted a minimum or conservative estimate 
since 9 fluid ounces of whiskey consumed over a long period 
of time would be absorbed by the body and eliminated at 
' 
such a rate that no or very little alcohol concentration cou;: 
be built up (T. 169). Such an amount of alcohol (9 fluid 
ounces l . would have to be consumed over an hour to an hour 
and a half. with the last drink coming an hour prior to a 
.19% reading, in order for there to be a blood alcohol 
concententration of 0.19%, according to Dr. Finkle (T. 269).1 
The passenqer in appellant's car, Eppie Duran, 
testified that appellant had a glass of something to drink 
about 10:25 p.m., immediately prior to their leaving a 
friend's house (T. 177). Appellant drank it "real fast" as 
they were leaving (T. 177) . Duran said that he (himself)' 
was drinking whiskey and coke (T. 176) , but could not say 
what appellant was drinking (T. 176). Duran stated that he 
felt a little intoxicated when he left their friend's house 
and headed up State Street (north) (T. 179) • Testimony by 
1 Testimony by Officer Smith, Rigby, Peay, and Wil~inson 
revealed that appellant did not have any a~coholic . 45 P·~'· beverage to drink from the time of the accident (lO • 1341. 
until the time the blood samples were taken (T. 128, 
-8-
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---
ouran also revealed that he told appellant to slow down as 
they were approaching the intersection at State Street and 
3900 South (T. 180). 
Testimony by Trooper Taylor of the Utah Highway 
Patrol revealed that skid marks were left by appellant's 
vehicle immediately prior to the collision (T. 149, 152). 
Gouge marks were also present (T. 154) . 
Finally, testimony by Trooper Steen of the Utah 
Highway Patrol revealed that the cycle of operation of the 
traffic lights at the intersection of 3900 South and State 
Street on the night of July 21, 1977, was such that the through 
traffic lanes (north and southbound) were red when the left 
turn green arrow was on. The traffic lights controlling 
north and southbound traffic would remain red until all 
left turning traffic would have cleared (T. 166-167). He 
also stated that the "gutter portion" of the road on which 
appellant was traveling was used about 80% of the time as a 
right turn lane (T. 167). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY THAT AN ELEMENT OF AUTO-
MOBILE HOMICIDE IS NEGLIGENCE AND 
THAT TO SUSTAIN A CHARGE OF AUTO-
MOBILE HOMICIDE, THE JURY MUST FIND, 
AMONG OTHER ELEHENTS, THAT APPELLANT 
DROVE OR OPERATED HIS MOTOR VEHICLE 
IN A NEGLIGENT MANNER. 
Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously 
instructed the jury inthe elements of automobile homicide 
-9-
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because the court instructed the jury that simple negligence 
was the type of negligence that the State must prove. ~ 
further contends that the proper standard of negligence ~ 
which the jury should have been instructed and to which the 
State must be held in their burden of proof is criminal 
negligence. 
Appellant concedes that his contention and argumen: 
has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in previous cases, 
State v. Durant, 561 P.2d 1056, (Utah, 1977), State v. Wade, 
572 P.2d 398 (Utah, 1977), State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061 
(Utah, 1977), and State v. Risk, 520 P. 2d 215 (Utah, 1974). 
He nevertheless argues that these cases should be overruled 
and the dissenting opinion of Justice Maughan in State v. 
Durant, supra, be adooted as law in this state. Snch an arou: 
by appellant is apparently based upon two statutory provisions 
§ 76-2-101, Utah Code Ann., (1953, as amended), and § 76-5-ln 
Utah Code Ann., ( 1953, as amended), which appellant claims 
are in conflict with the automobile homicide statute, 
§ 76-5-207, Utah Code Ann., (1953, as amended). 
Respondent submits that the law in this state 
is well settled, i.e. , in an automobile homicide prosecution, 
the State need prove only simple negligence and not criminal 
1 . Stt D t atl058·,Statev.W~• neg igence. a e v. uran , supra, 
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supra, at 400; State v. Anderson, supra, at 1063; State v. 
~· supra at 213. 
Appellant has advanced no reason why this Court 
should reverse itself and change the present state of the 
law. Respondent submits there is no need for change, since 
the statutes cited by appellant are not in conflict. 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-201 (1953, as amended), speaks of the 
elements and ways in which one may commit criminal homicide: 
(1) A person commits criminal homicide 
if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, 
or with criminal negligence unlawfully 
causes the death of another. 
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in 
the first and second degree, manslaughter, 
or negligent homicide, or automobile 
homicide. 
(Emphasis added) . 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-2-101 (1953, as amended), reads: 
No person is guilty of an offense 
unless his conduct is prohibited by 
law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly or with criminal negligence 
with respect"""to each element of the 
offense as the definition of the offense 
requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense 
involving strict liability. 
(Emphasis added) . 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-207 (1953, as amended), defines 
automobile homicide: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
automobile homicide if the actor, while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, 
-11-
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a controlled substance, or any drug, to 
a degree which renders the actor incapable of 
safely driving a vehicle, causes the death 
of another by operating a motor vehicle 
in a negligent manner. 
A careful reading of these statutes cited discloses 
no conflict. Secttons 76-2-101 and 76-5-201 are both 
written in the disjunctive. A person, under the terms of 
§ 76-5-201 may commit criminal homicide if he "intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence unlawfully 
causes the death of another." The statute does not require 
that the death be caused in all of the ways mentioned, only 
by one. The same principle holds true for § 76-2-101, where 
it specifies that one must act "intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly, or with criminal negligence with respect to 
each element of the offense as the definition of the offense 
requires." 
Applying §§ 76-5-201 and 76-2-101 to the automobile 
homicide section 76-5-207, it becomes evident that the 
elements of the offense of automobile homicide can be satisfied 
by one acting intentionally, or knowingly, or recklessly, or 
in a criminally negligent manner. As a specific example, one 
may be intentionally negligent, knowingly negligent, reckless) 
negligent, or negligent in a criminally negligent manner. 
Any manner is sufficient, as long as the evidence l. s sufficien: 
to meet the burden of proof. 
-12-
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r.: 
Furthermore, under the provisions of § 76-5-201, 
a person may commit criminal homicide (automobile homicide 
under 76-5-201(2)), in any one of four ways: intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly, or in a criminally negligent manner. 
As was stated in State v. Wade, 572 P.2d at 399, an act, in 
order to be labeled as one of criminal homicide under 
§ 76-5-201, be it automobile homicide or otherwise, need 
not necessarily be cornmi tted in a criminally negligent manner. 
Thus, appellant's allegation that cri~inal negligence i~ 
an element of automobile homicide does not stand. Had the 
legislature intended for criminal ngeligence to be the 
standard of negligence to which the prosecutor was bound in 
an automobile homicide prosecution most certainly they would 
have specified so in§ 76-5-207. Instead, the legislature 
used the term, 11 • • causes the death of another . . • in 
a negligent manner . . . 11 
The trial judge instructed the jury on the elements 
of automobile homicide specifically as they appear in the 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-207 (1953, as amended). (R. 75, 
76). These instructions were in harmony with the law as 
set forth by this Court in the Durant, Wade, Anderson and 
~ cases. Appellant has advanced no valid reason for 
this Court to reverse itself. The lower court's instructions 
regarding the elements of automobile homicide and the degree 
of negligence required must therefore be upheld. 
-13-
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY ON THE PRESUMPTIONS CREATED 
BY A BLOOD ALCOHOL LEVEL ABOVE 0.08 
SINCE THERE WAS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE GIVING OF SUCH AN INSTRUCTION. 
Appellant alleges that it was reversible error 
for the trial court to instruct the jury on the presumptions 
created by a blood alcohol level above 0.08. He attempts 
to support such an alleaation on the theory that no evidence 
existed to support such an instruction. Respondent submits 
that the record discloses evidence to support the giving 
of the instruction by the trial court regarding presumptions 
of being under the influence of intoxicating liquor (R. 78). 2 
Respondent agrees with appellant that in order to 
convict one of automobile homicide, the State must prove 
that a person was under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor to a degree which renders the person incapable of 
f 1 d . . h' 1 3 sa e y riving a ve ic e. From that, the State must 
also prove that at the time of the driving which resulted 
in the death of Eric Skollingsberg, the appellant, Johnnie 
Chavez, was under the influence of alcohol. The trial 
court so instructed (R. 76). 
2 
3 
The instruction given by the trial court was taken f~m 
Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44 (b) (1953, as amended}• 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-207 (1953, as amended). 
-14-
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A review of the evidence discloses that the 
state's expert witness, Dr. Bryan Finkle, 4 was called to 
back " or "extrapolate" the blood alcohol level of "relate 
appellant at the time the blood ~as taken to t~e time of 
the accident. In doing this, Dr. Finkle used several 
figures and gave two figures as to what appellant's blood 
alcohol level was at the time of the accident. He stated 
that in general, a person consuming alcohol will reach their 
maximum alcohol concentration level approximately one hour 
following their last drink (T. 251). In other words, after 
all drinking has ceased, alcohol is absorbed into a person's 
system during the next hour until a maximum alcohol con-
centration level in the blood is reached. Following this, 
the alcohol begins to "clear" from the blood at approximately 
0.02% per hour (T. 252). 
The evidence disclosed that appellant's blood 
samples were taken at 12:14 a.m. and 12:45 a.m. on July 
22, 1977, these times being some hour and a half and two 
hours after the accident at 10:45 p.m. on July 21, 1977 
(T. 190-101). These samples were analyzed and found to 
contain .19 percent alcohol by weight (T. 214). There was 
no specific time as to when appellant had his last drink. 
However, several pieces of evidence gave clues from which a 
Dr. Finkle, a toxicologist, pharamcologist, and pathologist 
at the University of Utah, qualified as an expert witness in 
Judge Baldwin's court at pages 247-258 of the trial transcript. 
-15-
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jury could infer time periods in which appellant would have 
had to have consumed his last drink. First appellant's frie:.: 
Eppie Duran, had been with appellant during the evening of 
July 21, and testified that appellant had nothing to drink 
after 10: 30 p.m. on July 21, fifteen minutes prior to the 
accident (T. 177). Duran stated that he saw appellant with 
a glass in his hand at 10:25 p.m., while they were at a 
friend's house (T. 177). Immediately prior to leaving 
their friend's house, appellant drank the liquid in the glass 
"real fast" (T. 177). Duran stated that he (himself) was 
drinking whiskey and coke, but he could not say for sure 
what appellant was drinking (T. 176). Respondent feels that 
at this point, based upon Duran's testimony, a jury could 
infer and/or deduce that if in fact whiskey or some type of 
alcohol was in appellant's glass just prior to leaving 
his friend's house, this drink would have been his last. 
Furthermore, Dr. Finkle's calculations, therefore, could be 
based upon 10:25 p.m. as a reference point for determining 
what the blood alcohol level was at 10:45 p.m., the time cl 
the accident. 
In determining the amount of alcohol appellant had 
consumed, Dr. Finkle testified that a person weighing the 
same as appellant (135 lbs.) , would have to have about 3.S 
fluid ounces of pure alcohol (7 fluid ounces of 100 proof 
alcohol) circulating in their body in order to obtain a 
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blood alcohol reading of .19% (T. 268). Since most whiskey 
is so-proof, appellant would have had to consume about nine 
fluid ounces of whiskey to have reached a .19% reading 
(T. 26). A jury could, therefore, based upon Dr. Finkle's 
testimony, find that at 12:14 a.m. on July 22, 1977, appellant 
had at least 3.5 fluid ounces of pure alcohol (7 fluid 
ounces of 100 proof alcohol or 9 fluid ounces of 80 proof 
alcohol) circulating in his blood stream. 
In relating back these figures to determine what 
the alcohol blood level would have been at 10:45 p.m., 
Dr. Finkle stated that such a figure would depend upon when 
the last drink was taken. Without knowing when the maximum 
alcohol concentration point occurred, and using the figure that 
alcohol clears the system at a rate of approximate .02% per 
hour, appellant's blood alcohol level at 10:45 p.m., would 
have been about .22%, which is well above the .08% of which 
appellant is complaining that there is no evidence 
264). 
(T. 262-
Dr. Finkle also stated that assuming alcohol was 
being absorbed, and the last drink was taken at 10:30 p.m., 
then maximum alcohol concentration level would be reached at 
approximately 11:30 p.m., and a chart which graphs alcohol 
absorption and alcohol blood content would intersect at 10:45 
p.m. somewhere between .05 and .08% (T. 277). Dr. Finkle 
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however, noted that the possibility of someone who st<!.E~ 
drinking at approximately 10:30 p.rn. and having a maximum 
blood alcohol concentration going from essentially zero (n~ 
having any drinking pattern), to 0.21% in one hour was 
extremely unlikely (T. 266) . He then went on to elaborate 
on the amount of alcohol that appellant would have had to ha1e 
consumed in order to show a reading of .19% at 12: 14 a.m. 
(T. 266-269). He further stated that if such an amount of 
alcohol had been consumed over a long period of time, the 
body would have absorbed it and eliminated it at such a 
rate the person would never have built up any alcohol con-
centration at all (T. 269). A jury could therefore deduce 
or find that the amount of alcohol found to be present in 
appellant's blood at 12:14 a.m. (a fact), would have had to 
have been consumed over a rather short period of time. 
Since the alcohol level was at least at a . 21% level at 11:14 
p.m. on July 21, 1977, a jury could find that the alcohol 
blood level would have been at least .09% at 10:45 p.m., 
and probably much higher. As Dr. Finkle stated, the 
possibility of a person's alcohol blood level going from 
.08% at 10:45 p.m. (0% at 10:30 p.m., assuming>appellant's 
one and only 9 ounce drink was consumed at 10:25 p.m.), to 
21% 11 14 · t 1 t Thi' s would represent . at : p.m. is ex reme y remo e. 
a jump of .13% alcohol blood level in 30 minutes. Based 
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upon this, a jury could find that appellant had consumed more 
than one 9 fluid ounce drink at 10:25, and had in fact been 
drinking throughout the evening. Furthermore, a jury could 
also find that appellant's blood level was well above .. 08% 
at the time of the accident, based upon Dr. Finkle's testimony, 
which in turn was based upon reasonable medical certainty. 
Respondent thus submits that there was certainly 
ample evidence upon which to give point 3 of Instruction No. 
17 (R. 78). Respondent also submits that case law supports 
respondent's position that the instruction was properly 
given. 
State v. Bradley, 578 P.2d 1267 (Utah, 1978), 
which appellant cites, does not support his allegations, 
but instead supports respondent's argument and explains the 
law as it exists in Utah. In Bradley, defendant was convicted 
of driving under the influence, showed an alcohol blood 
level of .06% four hours after he ran a red light, and 
caused an accident. He alleged that the trial court should 
not have instructed the jury with regard to statutory 
presumptions based on blood alcohol levels present at 
the time of the incident because the state was allegedly 
unable to adequately extrapolate the chemical test results 
to that time. In agreeing with the defendant, the Court said: 
Thus, in cases arising before 
the enactment of 41-6-44.5, if the 
state is unable to produce chemical 
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test results sufficient, to allow a 
presumption of intoxication when 
the test was administered, it must 
necessarily provide expert testimony 
to extrapolate the lower readings back 
to the time of the incident to show that 
a defendant's blood alcohol level was 
then sufficient to give rise to the 
presumption. 
578 P.2d at 1269 (emphasis added). 
It is certainly evident that the state in the case at bar 
has met all the requirements of Bradley. First, the state 
introduced chemical test results showing a .19% reading at 
the time the test was administered. This is well above the 
. 08% re9uisite before a presumption of intoxication arises. 
Second, the state, through the use of expert testimony, · 
extrapolated the results back to show a possible . 22% readinc 
at the time of the accident. 5 Even using the situation, 
arguendo, where one drink was taken at 10:30 p.m., a readin9 
going from zero to . 21% in 45 minutes is extremely unlikely. 
Thus, a reading above .08% at 10:45 p.m., is at worst a very 
definite "reasonable medical certainty." 
5 It is questionable whether or not according to the langua:: 
in Bradley, the State is required to extrapolate the r~si ... 
back if the results at the time of testing show that te 
presumption cutoff (.08%)is met. 
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Finally, attention is called to three cases which 
support respondent's argument. In State v. Koklasch, Or. App., 
502 P.2d 1158 (1972), defendant alleged that his case should 
not have been submitted to the jury because there was in-
sufficient evidence to show what his blood alcohol context was 
at the time he was driving the automobile. The statute under 
which he was convicted prohibited driving a motor vehicle when 
the alcohol content was more than .15%. Defendant's test 
showed .23% 33 minutes after his arrest. The court held 
that the test results raised a rebuttable presumption that 
the blood alcohol content was not less than shown thereby 
when the defendant was driving. 
In State v. Turner, 94 Idaho 548, 494 P.2d 146 
(1972), the defendant objected to the giving of an instruction 
raising a presumption of intoxication. He was involved in 
an accident and took the breath test some two hours and 45 
minutes later. The results showed .10%. The presumption of 
intoxication was "more than .10% by weight alcohol." In 
upholding the giving of the instruction, the Idaho Supreme 
Court said: 
The test revealed a blood alcohol 
content of 0.10%. Since the alcohol 
content decreases at the rate of 0.01% 
to 0.02% per hour after tte first forty-
five to sixty minutes, the state's 
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chemical analyst testified that 
0.10% was less than the "peak" 
alcohol content reached earlier 
that night. 
494 P.2d at 148. 
Subsequent to Turner, the Idaho Supreme Court 
in State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523, 547 P.2d 1128 (1976), 
held that: 
. . . this statute [creating 
presumptions in a prosecution for 
Driving under the Influence] does 
not require extrapolation back but 
establishes that the percentage of 
blood alcohol as shown by chemical 
analysis relates back to the time of 
the alleged offense for purposes of 
applying the statutory presumption. 
547 P.2d at 1130 (emphasis added). 
Respondent thus submits that the evidence was 
sufficient to warrant the giving of point 3 of Instruction 
No. 17, instructing the jury on the presumptions of 
intoxication. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SHOW THAT APPELLANT, AT THE TIME 
OF THE ACCIDENT, WAS UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL SUFFICIENTLY TO 
A DEGREE TO RENDER HIM INCAPABLE OF 
SAFELY DRIVING A VEHICLE. 
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficie:· 
to convict him of automobile homicide and for that reason, 
. a' 
the court below erred in not granting his motion to dismiss · 
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the conclusion of the State's case (T. 287). Appellant, 
in his brief states that " .. there was simply no evidence 
of his intoxication at the time of driving. 
Brief, p. 11. 
" Appellant's 
Respondent strongly challenges such a statement 
by appellant. The evidence speaks for itself regarding the 
issue of intoxication at the time of driving: 
1. Appellant drove his car through a red traffic 
light (T. 48-49, 56-59, 60-63, 73, 83-84, 91-92, 98, 109, 117). 
2. Appellant drove through the intersection in 
a lane not designated for through traffic. The "lane" was 
used only for right turns and for buses stopping for passengers 
(T. 66, 95, 167). 
3. The car which appellant "struck" was lawfully 
making a left turn through the intersection (T. 38-49). 
4. Appellant was driving the car at a fast rate 
of speed (T. 57, 71, 63) (60 miles per hour and 65 miles· per 
hour, T. 71 , 8 3 ) . 
5. Appellant came so close to hitting two young 
boys sitting at a bus stop bench that they had to pull up 
their feet to keep from getting hit (T. 109, 117). 
6. When appellant exited his car following the 
accident, he "wandered around," acting as if he were in a 
daze (T. 98-99). 
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7. Officers who arrived at the scene shortly afte: 
the accident stated that they detected the odor of alcohol 
about appellant's person (T. 123, 128). The nurse who 
withdrew samples of appellant's blood, Evelyn Mayberry, stat, 
that she detected the odor of alcohol on appellant"s ~9u 
(T. 191). She also stated that his pupils were dilated 
(T. 191). 
8. Appellant's blood alcohol level one and one·ha' 
hours after the accident was .19% (T. 214). Using a "burn< 
rate of • 02% per hour, this would give appellant a blood 
alcohol level of . 22% at the time of the accident (T. 263· 
264). 
9. Evidence produced through Dr. Finkle establishe; 
that appellant would have had to consumed a minimum of 9 
fluid ounces during the previous hours to obtain a blood 
alcohol level of .19% (T. 269). 
10. Assuming that appellant drank his 9 fluid 
ounces of alcohol at 10:30 p.m. or thereabouts, Dr. Finkle's 
testimony would seem to infer that for appellant to go from 
0% alcohol blood level to . 21% 45 minutes later is bordering 
on the incredible. A jury could infer that appellant h~ 
been drinking alcohol over the course of the evening. 
Testimony, uncontradicted, evidences that appellant had 
nothing alcoholic to drink after 10:30 p.m. Thus, most of 
the nine ounces of alcohol came during a period prior to 
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l0:30 p.m. Thus, with appellant's blood alcohol level 
being .21% at 11:15 p.m., most certainly his blood alcohol 
level would have been above .08 only 30 minutes earlier. 
These facts constitute sufficient evidence on 
which reasonable minds could have based a decision to find 
that appellant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
at the time of the accident to such a degree that he .was 
rendered incapable of safely driving a vehicle. Appellant 
offered no evidence to show otherwise. Respondent further 
submits that notwithstanding the presumption of being under 
the influence, the evidence is sufficient to convict 
appellant of automobile homicide. 
Appellant has not challenged any other elements 
of the crime other than being under the influence to the 
degree required. Respondent thus submits that the evidence 
is sufficient to sustain the conviction, and the ruling of 
the trial court overruling appellant's motion to dismiss 
because of insufficiency of evidence should be affirmed. 
A. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE EXHIBITS 11 AND 12, 
THE RESULTS OF APPELLANT'S BLOOD 
TESTS. 
Appellant contends that § 41-6-44.5 Utah Code 
Ann., (1953, as amended), was not complied with, and as a 
result, the blood test results showing the alcohol blood 
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level content of appellant should not have been admitted 
• He 
a:c-gues that the blood tests were taken more than hour after 
the accident and that the State did not prove the probative 
value of such tests. 
Respondent submits that appellant is wrong in 
his argument on two counts. First, the section which appelk: 
is arguing is § 41-6-44. 5. The Automobile Homicide Statute, 
§ 76-5-207, refers to § 41-6-44 (b), of the Utah Motor Vehicle 
Act: 
(2) The presumption established by 
section 4-6-44(b) of the Utah Motor 
Vehicle Act, relating to blood alcohol 
percentage shall be applicable to this 
section and any chemical test administered 
on a defendant . . . after his arrest. 
shall be admissible in accordance with 
the rules of evidence. 
'I 
Respondent merely points out the fact that the legisla~u 
did specifically mention § 41-6-44 (b) of the Motor Vehicle 
Act, to the exclusion of other statutes. Furthermore, 
§ 76-5-207(2) specifies that" ... any chemical test 
administered . . . shall be admissible in accordance with the 
rules of evidence." Respondent again points out the fact 
that the legislature specifically stated that the chemical. 
tests be admissible according to the rules of evidence, not 
according to § 41-6-44.5. 
Respondent notes that § 41-6-44. 5, through the use 
of its language, may bring§ 76-5-207(2) within the previewof 
its terms: 
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In any action or proceeding in 
which it is material to prove that 
a person was driving under the influence 
of alcohol . . . 
Notwithstanding the fact that § 76-5-207 may or 
may not come within th€ perview of § 41-6-44.5, respondent 
submits that the State has complied with the terms of § 41-6-44.5. 
Since the test was administered more than an hour following 
the accident, one requirement must be met in order for the 
blood test results to be admissible. that requirement 
being that the probative value of the tests be established 
through the use of expert testimony. 
The probative value was established via the testimony 
of Dr. Bryan Finkle. He showed through the use of "extra-
polation" what appellant's blood alcohol level would have 
been at the time of the accident using facts, figures, and 
data based upon reasonable medical certainty. His qualifications 
as an expert in the field of forensic toxicology were accepted 
by the trial court after examination and voir dire (T. 259). 
His testimony was allowed by the court, and pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 56(2) (3), his testimony as an 
expert witness was properly admitted. Certainly there can 
be no question as to the probative value of his testimony as 
to the blood level of appellant at the time of the accident. 
Appellant, in challenging the results of the test, is 
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admittedly dissatisfied with the apparent decision of the 
jury to believe the expert testimony of Dr. Finkle. No 
reason has been shown as to why his testimony is not 
probative or as why the results of the blood tests should 
not have been accepted into evidence. Most of appellant's 
argument in Point III A. is devoted to why § 41-6-44.5 is 
applicable to § 76-5-207, instead of telling this Court what, 
if any reason, exists as to why the results of the tests 
should not be admitted and in what way the State did not 
tie in the probative value of Dr. Finkle's testimony. 
Finally, appellant cites the Bradley case {see 
Point I, infra) , apparently in support of his contentions. 
Respondent notes that appellant alleges in his brief that 
"No expert testimony was given there" (referring to the 
Bradley case). Respondent calls the Court's attention to 
the Bradley case at 578 P. 2d 1268 and 1269, where the Court 
several times refers to "the state's expert." The Bradle1 
case has seemingly been misinterpreted by appellant. There 
the court did not say that the test results were inadmissible 
because of a lack of probative value. The Court merely said 
that if the State is unable to produce chemical test resultS 
sufficient to allow a presumption of intoxication when the 
test was administered (. 08 or less), then expert testimony 
must be provided to extropolate the lower readings back to the 
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time of the incident to show that a defendant's blood 
alcohol level was then sufficient to give rise to the 
presumption. 
Respondent submits that the State: (1) provided 
expert testimony in the form of Dr. Finkle, which was 
accepted by the trial court; (2) such testimony was of 
probative value because the test results, which gave rise to 
a presumption at the time they were taken, were extrapolated 
back to the time of the accident to give rise to a presumption 
at that critical time. The test results were therefore 
properly admitted into evidence, and§ 41-6-44.5 was complied 
with. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
THE RESULTS OF THE BLOOD ALCOHOL 
ANALYSIS OR TO ALTERNATIVELY 
DISMISS THE ACTION. 
Appellant moved, prior to trial, to suppress the 
blood alcohol results of the blood samples taken from him 
(R. 23). A hearing was held before the same judge that 
tried the case (T. 478-504). Evidence was taken, a memorandum 
submitted, and appellant's motion denied. Appellant claims 
such a ruling was reversible error. 
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The evidence at the hearing revealed that foll . 
OW1n; 
appellant's accident during the late hours of July 21, 197), 
two samples of blood were removed from his arm at approximat, 
12:14 a.m. and 12:48 a.m. on July 22, 1977. The samples were 
removed by Evelyn Mayberry, a Registered Nurse. The followi;: 
day those samples were turned over to Lvnn Davis, a chemist 
with the Salt Lake County Health Department. Testimony by 
Mr. Davis reveals that those samples were kept in a refrigera:· 
in his laboratory until they were tested on August 1, 1977, 
He stated that he kept the samples in his refrigerator until 
testing in order to guard the chain of evidence and in order 
to prolong the life of a preservative which was in the tube, 
along with the blood and alcohol ( R. 4 9 5) . Mr. Davis also 
stated that upon his analysis completion of the samples, 
they were put in a box and sent to the State Health Departrne: 
for analysis (R. 495) . The samples were kept at room 
temperature in the interim period between analysis and beinc 
sent to the State Health Department (R. 495). The trial 
court asked Mr. Davis about any experiments he may have 
performed testing blood alcohol samples which had been 
kept in a refrigerator over an extended period of timeu 
opposed to samples which had been left out at room temperatu: 
Mr. Davis replied that he had performed only one such ex-
periment. He further stated that there 
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which affect the decrease of blood alcohol content of a 
sample, temperature being one (R. 496). Mr. Davis said 
also that it was his usual procedure not to refrigerate 
samples after completion of testing (R. 499). When asked 
whether he would have any knowledge as to whether or 
not there would be any deterioration or increase of blood 
alcohol levels over a period of time if a sample were 
refrigerated for five months, he responded he did not know 
since he had not done any work in that area (R. 499) . 
Appellant's argument alleges that the act (by Lynn 
Davis) of leaving his blood specimens at room temperature 
is tantamount to destroying those samples. 
Respondent submits that appellant's allegations are 
totally unfounded for several reasons. First, it is 
questionable as to whether or not Lynn Davis, a chemist 
with the County Health Department, is, in fact, an agent of 
the prosecution's office. The trial court found that he was 
not (R. 502). It is not necessary to the disposition of this 
issue to decide whether or not in this case he was in fact 
an agent of the prosecution. Respondent will assume, 
arguendo, that he was. 
Second, it is very important to note that the 
record does not disclose that appellant ever requested the 
trial court or the prosecution to turn over to him one of the 
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samples so that a separate analysis could be run by another 
chemist at defense counsel's request. The record reflects 
that appellant was referred to the Legal Defender's Office or, 
August 12, 19 77. Counsel appeared with him in court on 
August 15, 1977. The record just reflects the appearance 
of appellant's present counsel on September 8, 1977 (R. 3). 
An information was filed on November 3, 1977 (R. 9). Finally, 
on January 5, 19 7 8, appellant through his present counsel fik 
his motion to suppress (R. 23). A time period of almost 
four months elapsed between defense counsel's first record 
of appearance and his filing of the motion. The record does 
not reflect that a request was ever made to the court 
or the prosecution that a blood sample be turned over to the 
defense for separate analysis. Respondent will concede that 
if appellant had made a request for such a sample, and it 
thereby was denied, or if there was a long delay in turning 
.. over the sample after it was requested, perhaps appellant's 
claim would be stronger, particularly if he could show that 
such a delay caused the sample content to be altered in such 
t t · ld t lt Such, however, is a way as no o yie accura e resu s. 
not the case. 
Appellant has not shown what he alleges. He has 
presented no evidence that the blood samples (alcohol content: 
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would have produced any other results than those offered at 
trial. He has not shown in what way, if any, the blood 
samples were suppressed or destroyed. They have not been 
destroyed -- they were offered at trial as evidence. They 
have not been suppressed from the defense--no request has been 
made for them to be made available. All that has been done 
is that a blatant allegation by appellant has been made with 
no evidence whatsoever to substantiate it. 
Finally, appellant has not shown that they (samples), 
(if this Court finds they have been destroyed) , were material 
to appellant's guilt or innocence. State v. Stewart, 544 
P.2d 477 (Utah, 1975). The rule of law in Utah, as set 
forth by this Court in the Stewart case is: 
. a deliberate suppression 
or destruction of evidence by those 
charged with the prosecution; including 
police officers, constitutes a denial 
of due process if the evidence is 
material to the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. 
544 P.2d at 479 (emphasis added). 
Appellant has not shown that his analysis of the 
blood samples would be material to his guilt or innocence. 
Two samples were withdrawn from appellant. Both samples 
revealed the same blood alcohol content (.1990). Even if 
appellant had run a test on a sample, it is difficult to 
imagine that such a test would do anything other than corroborate 
the prosecution's case. 
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Both samples were available or would have been made 
available to appellant if he had requested them (at 1 east one 
sample would have been available). 
The fundamental fairness guaranteed appellant under 
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the State 
and Federal Constitutions has not been violated or abridged. 
As such, the trial court's ruling should be sustained. 
POINT V. 
THE RECORD INDICATES THAT 
APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY SENTENCED 
TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON. 
Appellant contends that he was sentenced in 
his absence, and that he must now be resentenced. The 
record discloses that on April 14, 1978, appellant was 
sentenced to be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison for a 
term of zero to five years. Appellant was present, and a stay 
of execution was granted to July 14, in order that appellant 
could undergo a 90-day evaluation (R. 140, 138-139). A further! 
90-day evaluation was ordered on July 14 (R. 155). Appellant 
absconded from Odyssey House on August 12, and a bench 
warrant was issued on August 15, 1978 (R. 158). The minute 
entry shows that on October 27, 1978, appellant's counsel 
d I 
appeared without appellant and the trial court did not exten 
'1 14 the stay of execution of the sentence pronounced on Apri 
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(R. 165, 166). The bench warrant was still outstanding, and 
the minute entry reads as follows: 
R. 165. 
The above named defendant having 
been granted a stay of execution of 
sentence to this date. Now on the courts 
own motion and good cause appearing 
thereof, it is ordered that a commitment 
issue forthwith as heretofore sentenced. 
The Judgment and Commitment read exactly the same. (R. 166). 
Respondent submits that appellant was properly 
sentenced the first time on April 14, 1978, when he was 
present. The proceedings on October 27, 1978, were for the 
purpose of discontinuing the stay of execution. Thus, 
appellant has shown no need to be re-sentenced. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent has shown that the alleged errors complained 
of by appellant were not in fact errors at all. The trial 
court properly instructed the jury that simple negligence, 
not criminal negligence, is the proper degree of negligence 
to be proved in an automobile homicide prosecution. Second, 
there was ample evidence to support the giving of the in-
struction of the presumptions created by a blood alcohol 
level of 0.08%. Third, the evidence was sufficient on 
which reasonable minds could conclude that appellant, at 
the time of the accident, was under the influence of alcohol 
sufficiently to a degree to render him incapable of safely 
driving a vehicle. Fourth, the blood test results were 
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properly received into evidence and were tied in to ~e 
time of the accident via expert testimony. Fifth, appellant's 
claim that the blood alcohol samples were "destroyed" is 
totally without merit for the reasons cited by respondent. 
Finally, appellant was properly sentenced, and he must serve 
the sentence imposed upon him if appellant's appeal is dismis 
For these reasons, respondent urges that the 
judgment of conviction of the lower court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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